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Introduction 
GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION I.N KENYA, 1966-1969 
By Susanne D, Mueller 
Little exists to document the widespread repression of opposition in 
Africa since independence. Current studies of the rise of capitalism and the 
post-colonial state largely ignore institutionalized authoritarianism, which 
characterizes the political side of this process. 1 The paper below discusses 
the repression of opposition in Kenya up to 1972. Its salience continues with 
Kenya having become a de jure one party state under President Daniel arap Moi 
and the increasingly repressive atmosphere since the abortive coup of 1982. It 
now appears that authoritarianism must be regarded as part of the ongoing 
political process and not simply as episodic. 
Following a peaceful transition to power from former President Jomo 
Kenyatta to President Daniel arap Moi in 1978, the political atmosphere ini-
tially seemed more relaxed. Political detainees were released, former KPU 
opposition party president Odinga Oginga was given a parastatal appointment, 
the masses were placated with populist rhetoric and free school milk. However, 
the respite from repression was shortlived. The coffee boom was over and 
Kenya's economy paralleled the downward spiraling world economy. The poor 
man's dream of upward mobility had been partly realized during the Kenyatta 
era. A growing economy plus the land, jobs and houses left by departing colo-
nialists had resulted in some redistribution, not only by race, but also by 
class. Now, it was no longer possible. Many of the urban fruits of uhuru 
(freedom) were already taken. Twenty years earlier, university graduates could 
almost be assured of a high-ranking government job, and a secondary school 
graduate would definitely find employment with promise of a middle class life 
to follow. In a depressed economy, unemployment among both groups was more 
likely than the previous dreams of either. Simultaneously, the lower middle 
class also saw its hopes dashed and its lifestyle eroded. White collar by vir-
tue of its shirts and aspirations, this part of the middle class found itself 
increasingly proletarfanized through inflation and successive devaluations, 
accounting in part for threatened strikes by groups such as bank workers. 
Poorer parts of the peasantry were no better off. With the parcellization of 
land, farm prices which did not keep pace with inflation, plus population 
pressures, poor peasants found it increasingly difficult to reproduce them-
selves off the land along, but a constricted economy yielded fewer job oppor-
tunities. The ruling class itself also began to show signs of strain. The 
Kikuyu bourgeoisie, within which both political and economic power had been 
consolidated during the Kenyatta presidency, began to feel marginalized. Its 
conglomerate (the Gikuyu Embu and Meru Association - GEMA) was forcibly 
deregistered while a number of key Kikuyus in government were displaced. 
Whether because of mismanagement, corruption, or the reluctance of farm-
ers to grow and sell food crops due to poor prices, there was a shortage of 
maize meal, the basic staple, in 1980. This led to long queues and massive 
imports from America, both of which contributed to a balance of payments 
crisis. Simultaneously, the World Bank pressured for structural adjustments 
while the U.S. consolidated its position at the port of Mombasa, investing 
over $50 million to dredge and "develop" it, 
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The food crisis paved the way for criticism by the alienated or margin-
alized groups mentioned above. Unsigned documents attacking the government 
began to circulate. Within this context, the regime appeared more fragile and 
Moi's legitimacy less assured. Already stripped of his statutory board 
appointment, Odinga and another ex-detainee, former M.P. George Anyona, held 
press conferences criticizing the government and talked of forming another 
political party. Soon afterwards, a law was passed making Kenya a de jure one-
party state. 
responded by attacking outside agitators to divert criticism 
Asians were accused of taking funds outside the country and 
The regime 
away from itself. 
were warned that 
greeted with tear 
occasions. Marxism 
were searched, and 
their citizenship was, at best, precarious. Students were 
gas, the police, and closure of the university on numerous 
and Marxist lecturers were routinely attacked; their houses 
finally some were imprisoned or detained by 1982. 
It was in this context that an attempted coup took place on August 1, 
1982. It was greeted initially with some anticipation, plus widespread loot-
ing, perhaps indicative of the lllslrginalization of various classes and groups 
discussed earlier. Following the abortive coup, lower-level air force 
personnel and students were arrested, Odinga was put under house arest, and 
his son Raila was charged with treason and later detained.2 
Looking back from 1983, it appears that many of the tools of repression 
which were articulated under colonialism and refined by a new ruling class 
following independence are still used to consolidate the state against its 
detractors. Hence, the continued relevance of this paper, which examines the 
historical roots of Kenya's authoritarianism as well as the state's success in 
eliminating its opponents. Its focus is 'the suppression of a Kenyan opposition 
party, the Kenya People's Union (KPU). Specifically, it examines why the party 
was so weak and so easily eliminated. It suggests that the weakness and sup-
pression of opposition parties in Kenya has stemmed primarily from the KANU 
government's monopoly of key coercive sanctions and economic resources. The 
study argues that it was this inequitable distribution inherited from the 
colonial period and consolidated afterwards, rather than the KPU's ethnic base 
among the Luo that was critical in explaining the party's demise.3 The general 
point concerning the effect of statism 4 on political competition supports the 
assertion that "The circumstances most favorable for competitive politics 
exist when access to violence and socioeconomic sanctions is either dispersed 
or denied to both oppositions and government. "The least favorable ci rcum-
stances exist when violence and socio-economic sanctions are exclusively 
available to government and denied to oppositions• 115 More particularly, the 
study maintains that the effect of statism in Kenya was to endow Kenya's new 
ruling class with an enormous degree of authority which it could effectively 
use to blunt opposition on a countrywide basis. The argument forces us to 
challenge one bit of conventional wisdom: that Africa's paucity of economic 
resources and its underdeveloped technology have limited the political author-
ity of regimes in the periphery. Such a view fails to take account of the way 
in which a regime's monopoly of resources and sanctions, the small scale of 
most rural communities, and the consequent lack of anonymity all work to 
facilitate political control in the countryside as well as in the cities.6 
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The discussion below examines the historical origins of statism in Kenya 
and its legacies, describes the way in which the regime's monopoly of 
resources and sanctions was used to blunt the KPU from 1966 to 1969, and 
analyzes the effect of this monopoly on the composition or membership of the 
opposition party, 
The Historical Origins of Statism and its Legacies 
Sanctions 
In Kenya, the inequitable distribution of sanctions and resources 
between government and opposition was insured with the inception of colonial 
rule. With the imposition of a "common authority, 117 the colonial government 
developed a highly authoritarian set of institutions, laws, and tactics 
designed to administer the country and to repress emerging African associa- · 
tions opposed to its rule, It was this "common authority" and this centralized 
authoritarian apparatus that was transferred from whites to blacks at indepen-
dence. In Kenya and elsewhere in Africa, one of the most important legacies of 
the colonial period was the_ creation of "institutions of governance with a 
near monopoly _of authority" and an "absence of counterveiling institutions. 118 
The origin of "common authority, 11 its total impact and the nature of its 
transfer all suggest that it is the "inherited colonial rather than tradi-
tiona 1 ins ti tut ions "9 which are cri tica 1 in understanding post-independent 
political patterns between government and opposition in Kenya. 
The persistence of institutional legacies from the colonial period is 
acknowledged in most discussions of post~independence politics in Kenya. Few 
authors have failed to mention the importance of the inherited centralized 
administration which continues to act as the arm of the executive, of weak 
district-oriented faction-ridden political parties which were kept from 
organ1z1ng at the national level during the colonial period, and of a verbally 
vigorous, but politically impotent legislature,10 
The most important aspect of these colonial legacies was not simply the 
institutional transfer itself, as is often argued, but the nature of the 
institutions which were transferred. African nationalists were bequeathed 
institutions and laws which were designed to provide the government with a 
monopoly of coercive sanctions and resources that Could be used to maintain 
law and order, to repress opponents, and ultimately to discourage dissent or 
politics itself. It is the authoritarian nature of the institutions and laws 
(and the similar ends for which they are used) rather than the mere fact of 
institutional transfer which is of more than passing interest. As one author 
has noted, "it is useless for the pundits of the Western press to accuse 
Kenya, or for that matter, other African states of not practising Westminster 
democracy. It was not practised by the Westminster men themselves when they 
were in control. 11 11 
The civil service which was created under colonialism was, foi instance, 
never apolitical, The colonial administration was designed to insure stability 
and the continuation of British rule, As such, one of its main goals was to 
control and contain African politics within an administrative framework. To 
the extent that early African associations appeared threatening, civil ser-
vants had a vast array of laws and tactics which were used to stifle and in 
some cases to eliminate political groups. Among these laws were controls over 
the licensing of political meetings, the registration of political parties and 
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their branches, the issuance of permits to travel to "outlying districts," and 
requests to solicit funds on behalf of various political groups. Civil 
servants were also encouraged to inform the executive of any "bad hats" which 
should be detained or any subversive groups which should be banned. To the 
extent that the colonial government permitted African politics outside of the 
quasi-representative bodies known as Loe-al Native Councils, the administration 
used its laws, manpower, and intelligence network to encourage what it per-
ceived as the more conservative groups and to discourage radical groups which 
in their eyes threatened to undermine the stability of British rule. Not only 
was the administration successful, but its success was not top-heavy. The 
civil service network was hardly confined to Nairobi and a vast array of 
officials including provincial and district commissioners, district officers, 
and locational chiefs effectively penetrated the rural areas and finally 
forced organized political groups opposed to the colonial government under-
ground in the 1940s and 1950s. 
The idea that parties, pressure groups, and representative organs should 
become separate arms of government was never more than a myth. First and last 
they were adjuncts of the colonial system. When they acted to buttress the 
system, political groups were sometimes tolerated used by the administration 
as supportive devices. When they were threatened as challengers, they were 
stifled. 
It is sometimes argued that "Mau Mau" was the catalyst which ensured the 
creation of a more political, more authoritarian civil service which could 
effectively control opposition politics on a countrywide basis. The enlarged 
Civil service known as "closer administration" and the vast battery of laws 
including those which first prohibited parties from forming at all and later 
confined them to the district level were surely means to this end. However, 
one of the reasons that several political groups were forced underground prior 
to "Mau Mau" was that the colonial administration was already an effective and 
highly authoritarian instrument of control. The period after 1952 simply 
elaborated methods which had been used earlier to blunt political opposition. 
Following the banning of the East African Association in the 1920s, political 
organizations were allowed to form providing that they limit their membership 
to a single tribe. Only in 1944, after the first African representative to the 
Legislative Council had been appointed was a countrywide political group 
allowed to organize. Even then, it was initially forced to parade as an 
advisory group to Mathu and call itself the Kenya African Study Union, before 
the colonial government would legitimate it. 
Not only did a provision surrounding the formation of countrywide polit-
ical groups predate the Emergency period from 1952-60, but many of the laws 
and techniques devised to manipulate and stifle politics at the national and 
the local level had already been well-developed. The legalistic tools to 
control political opposition were in effect prior to "Mau Mau." The "outlying 
districts ordinance" commenced in 1902 and effectively made it impossible for 
groups to organize across district lines unless individuals were granted per-
mits to move from one district to another by the colonial administration. 
Provisions to disallow or control political meetings were contained early on 
in both the Native Authorities and Police Ordinances. Consequently, the 
colonial administration had in these and other laws the ammunition to control 
African politics on a countrywide basis down to the most local level. 
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Initially, the colonial administration had hoped that African political 
associations would channel their grievances through the Local Native Councils 
and would not become independent foci for opposition themselves. A letter in 
1930, to the district commissioner of Kikuyu from the provincial commissioner 
voiced a common sentiment when he said, "the Local Native Council ... is a 
representative body which now makes Associations unnecessary and if the Kikuyu 
Association can be allowed to die by agreement the sooner the better I 
say.••• " 12 Of course, these early political associations did not "die by 
agreement." As they continued to circumvent "proper channels" and to raise 
issues that were viewed as subversive of good order, they came to feel the 
heavy hand of the administration, which initially used its common legal 
authority to exert political control and finally to ban some of them. 
The "representative" bodies which were established during the colonial 
period in Kenya were perversions of their British counterparts. At best they 
were sometimes forums of discussion; at worst mere extensions of the 
executive. At no time were they designed to act as independent legislative 
bodies or genuine pressure groups. Representation was controiled by the colo-
nial administration at the local level and nonexistent at the national level 
until very late. The Local Native Councils (which were established in 1924) 
had some elected posts, but were generally dominated by chiefs and headmen 
appointed by the governor and were presided over by the district commissioner. 
The first African was appointed to the Legislative Council in 1944, but direct 
representation began only in 1957. Even then their number was limited to eight 
and the franchise was exceedingly limited. Aside from the matter of represen-
tation, Africans found that the Local Native Councils could riot be used to air 
a certain class of issues. The colonial authorities attempted to limit the 
scope and subject matter of what was discussed even when Africans were 
prepared to direct their grievances through the "proper channels. nl3 When dif-
ferences were aired, Africans had no means of ensuring that their preferences 
would be followed. Consequently, the Local Native Councils provided only the 
most minimal avenues of expression. At the national level, Africans used the 
Legislative Council as a forum of lively debate, however, as B.E. Kipkorir 
notes, "the government was bound to the resolutions of the house. 1114 
At independence, African nationalists inherited a centralized adminis-
tration, district-oriented parties, and a relatively impotent legislature. The 
reasons why new institutions were not created at independence are not 
surprising. Over sixty years of admittedly authoritarian rule had nevertheless 
created a certain familiarity with its institutions and a lack of experience 
with alternative forms of common authority to put in its place. The resources 
needed to devise new statewide institutions were meager and in any case there 
seemed to be more pressing problems which demanded immediate attention, after 
independence. A complete overhaul of existing institutions might also have 
been viewed as unpragmatic, given Kenya's dependence on British aid. Finally, 
the anti-colonial struggle was for many a struggle against a racially 
dominated system and not against the system itself. Consequently, certain 
groups found that colonial laws and institutions were admirably suited to the 
retention of political power. When this power appeared to be threatened, many 
of these preindependence laws and institutions were used to the same ends as 
they had been during the colonial period. 
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Both the question of why the inherited authoritarian apparatus was kept 
and used so effectively to blunt political opposition and why it was so impor-
tant to retain political power, also have to do with the legacy of a statist 
economy, In both the pre- and post-independence periods, patronage as well as 
coercion was monopolized by the state. 
Resources 
During the pre-independence period, the colonial government attempted to 
create a moderate middle class, both to stabilize its rule and to guarantee 
continuity after 1963. That this class grew without an independent entrepre-
neurial base was no accident. It was tied to the state by virtue of the 
latter's monpoly over the means of production, jobs, and other economic 
rewards. Political moderation and economic mobility were thus wed, with 
politics providing access to wealth rather than the reverse. Consequently 
losing power or the state's favor had economic consequences which highlighted 
the essential poverty and fragility of the middle class. Early on Harry Thuku 
ld "h bt h' 'b d 1·· 1115 was to to c oose e ween is JO an po itics, and government headmen at 
the local level were warned th~t "adverse criticisms of government actions or 
politics cannot be permitted and will endanger their position. 1116 
After independence, the economic reasons for the retention of political 
power and the suppression of opposition became extremely important. As one 
author has noted, 
political power at independence devolved not to an indige-
nous propertied class, but to a social stratum of property 
hunters.... Although this class appears wealthy and is 
reknowned for conspicuous consumption, it is in reality a 
poor class: its wealth in houses, land, etc., is mortgaged 
and dependent on state protection for the loans it has 
acquired. This further strengthens the rigidity (since) 
relinquished political power would leave a member of this 
class saddled with debts.17 
With political and economic mobility wedded to the rise of an "indebted" mid-
dle class, Kenya developed into what Kim has called a "high risk system ••• 
where both the rewards of victory and the costs of defeat are great, 1118 ay~ 
where the typical response of office holders is to repress its opposition, 
Consequently, there were good economic reasons to retain the coercive 
apparatus inherited from the colonial era. One of many examples was a decision 
made in 1963 to keep a colonial ordinance requiring the licensing of public 
meetings. Although some MPs argued that the continuation of such provisions 
was 11 a confirmation of imperialists' techniques by the government, nZO the 
ch1ef commissioner advised Kenyatta's office as to what he thought the inten-
tions and purposes of the licensing provisions were: 
1. I fully support the Inspector General's view that this 
law will be required in the future. 
2. Not all public meetings will be called by political 
parties supporting the government; and the government of the 
day must continue to have powers to prevent meetings if they 
are likely to cause breaches of the feace or physical oppo-
sition to the government's policies.2 
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A day later, the Cabinet met and agreed that the licensing of public meetings 
should continue.22 
A further legacy of statism in Kenya after 1963 was that dependence on 
the state by one means or another was virtually the sole avenue available for 
economic mobility - whether for an individual, a group, or a district. Coleman 
and Rosberg have suggested that "the selective use of patronage to assimilate 
or control political opposition or to enlist the support of potentially dis-
sident elements has extraordinary importance in the new African states 
because of the strongly statist character of their societies. n23 Since the 
colonial government had not allowed the formation of a middle class with an 
independent entrepreneurial base, Kenya's economy was irrevocably tied to the 
metropole after 1968. What this meant in terms of legacies was that although 
there was a private sector in independent Kenya, that sector was predominantly 
foreign. Since it was foreign owned, it was dependent on the state for 
licenses to. operate. Consequently, it could not act as an independent source 
of power for political dissidents in search of employment or other economic 
goods, or for areas in search of development funds. 
The upshot was that in Kenya, the government effectively monopolized the 
control of key socio-economic resources: it became a major employer of 
salaried labor, the chief and sometimes sole disperser of development funds, 
trade licenses and other amenities, and it influenced the circulation of 
information through its control of the communications media. With few economic 
alternatives to the state, political opposition continued to be costly. And 
potentially, the costs of recalcitrance could be felt at every level of soci-
ety by every class because of the state's countrywide monopoly over sanctions 
and resources. The nature of the costs differed, but they were not confined to 
Nairobi or to the middle class elite. For a civil servant or a teacher the 
cost might be the loss of a job, for a small shopkeeper, the refusal to grant 
a trade license, for a local farmer, the inability to obtain a small loan, for 
a peasant, the refusal to grant famine relief, and so on. 
The Carr'ot and the Stick: The Government's Response to the KPU, 1966-1969. 
In March 1966, a group known as the Odinga faction broke with the Kenya 
African National Union (KANU), Kenya's party of independence. The formation of 
an opposition party was the culmination of ideological differences, leadership 
struggles, and the repression of dissent ·within KANU. Ideologically, the new 
party was to the left of the government on key issues concerning nationali-
zation, the distribution of scarce resources including land, health and 
educational services, and Kenya's foreign policy. The climax of 
disillusionment came at KANU's famous Limuru Conference - a long overdue, but 
hastily contrived party meeting which used constitutional engineering and 
electoral fraud to maneuver the dissidents out of their offices. In the wake 
of the conference, twenty-nine MPs, led by the former Vice-President Oginga 
Odinga, "crossed the floor" and formed the Kenya People's Union (KPU). The 
government responded by concocting and passing a constitutional amendment 
which forced all MPs who had left KANU to contest their seats that summer, in 
what became known as the "little general election." Having come to the elec-
tion twenty-eight strong, only nine KPU MPs were returned. Six of the winners 
including Odinga were Luos from Kenya's second largest tribe; of the remaining 
three non-Luos, two returned to KANU before the KPU was banned in 1969. 
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Beginning with the constitutional amendment, the government's response 
to the KPU was to use its countrywide monopoly of sanctions and resources 
inherited from the colonial period to suppress the party. The effects of the 
response were to restrict the KPU's freedom to organize, to make it especially 
costly for non-Luo individuals or areas to support the opposition, and to bol-
ster KANU's relative strength as a party. 
From 1966-1969, the KANU government restricted the KPU's freedom to 
organize and compete with the dominant party by refusing to register many of 
its branches and sub-branches, by prohibiting it from holding public meetings, 
and by passing a number of laws having to do with elections and detention that 
worked to the disadvantage of the opposition party. 
Party Registration 
The retention of the Societies Ordinance of 1952 after independence 
meant that all political parties and each of their branches and sub-branches 
were still required to obtain certificates of registration before they would 
be considered lawful and hence be allowed to organize. The registrar of soci-
eties, who was appointed by the attorney general, had an enormous range of 
legal reasons he could use to either refuse to register a society and its 
branches or to cancel their registration at any point in time,24 
Registration at the national level was vital since unregistered soci-
eties were "unlawful" and officebearers, members, and sympathizers who engaged 
in activities on their behalf could be punished. Before 1968, it was important 
for the KPU to have registered branches and sub-branches to recruit members, 
to establish a minimal presence in an area, and to begin to organize a 
countrywide network of supporters. Furthermore, individuals could not apply to 
collect funds or to hold meetings in the name of a party branch or sub-branch 
unless it was registered. Local political organizations in Kenya took on an 
even greater significance after 1968, following the passage of a law which (a) 
required all candidates for local and national elections to be supported by a 
political party and (b) set down a detailed procedure of nomination for all 
political parties that made the participation of branches and sub-branches 
mandatory. Prior to 1963, candidates could run as independents and there were 
no prescribed rules for nomination. Following the 1968 amendment to the elec-
tions' legislation, political parties could no longer run candidates either at 
the national or local levels if they did not have registered branches and 
sub-branches in the area concerned. Consequently, from 1968 onwards, it was 
not only important but critical for the KPU to obtain certificates of regis-
tration at the local level, since its ability to contest elections depended on 
it. 
In 1966, the government's lengthy delay in registering the KPU kept the 
party from establishing branches and organizing for the "little general 
election" until shortly prior to the contest. Soon afterwards, the government 
announced that "the country would still be ruled as a one-party state" and on 
numerous occasions President Kenyatta threatened to "trample ••• (the KPU) 
like mud" or to "crush them like snakes. 1125 
At the local level, it was extremely difficult for KPU branches and sub-
branches to obtain certificates of registration from the registrar of 
societies. From 1966 until 1969 the government refused to register an average 
of_ 42.7 percent of the KPU's applications for branches and sub-branches, 
Table I 
Total Number of KPU Branches and Sub-Branches 
Registered and Refused Registration: 1966-69 
1966 1967 1968 1969 
Registered 3 32 50 36 
Refused Registration 0 8 33 50 
TOTAL 3 40 83 86 
% Refused Registration 0 20 41.2 57.9 
Total Number of KANU Branches and Sub-Branches 




































Source: This information and that which follows was obtained from The Kenya 
Gazette, Vol, LXVIII, No. 26, 31 May 1966 - Vol, LXXI, No. 48, October 
1969. Under the Societies Ordinance all registrations and refusals of 
registrations are required to be published in the Gazette. Only the name 
of the particular branch and sub-branch is listed, however. In most 
cases, it was possible to locate the place according to district and 
province by using maps, gazeteers, or obtaining the help of Kenyan friends. 
The location of several places is still unknown and they are listed that 
way when it is pertinent. 
During 1969, the refusal rate reached"a high of 57.9 percent. During the same 
three and one-half year period, the average refusal rate for KANU was only 1.8 
percent.26 
Even then, the figures actually underrate the magnitude of the bias 
against the opposition. At its inception, in mid-1966, the KPU had no branches 
or sub-branches whereas at that time, KANU had been in operation since 1960 
and had at least a vestige of organization at the local level throughout the 
country. Furthermore, the figures do not measure how many local KPU groups did 
not make formal applications for registration out of fear of reprisals, be-
cause they felt that the difficulties were too overwhelming, or because the 
chances of refusal seemed too obvious. Finally, it is doubtful that by 1969 
the KPU still had 121 registered branches and sub-branches, but it is impos-
sible to know how many folded because of intimidation and governmental 
pressure. It is this kind of a bias emanating through the registrar of 
societies that gave KANU an advantage over the KPU and demonstrated the 
dominant party's marginal strength in comparison with its opposition. 
The government's effectiveness in limiting local opposition party 
branches was not confined to Nairobi. In other words it was not simply a mat-
ter of the registrar general saying 'no' to an application received at the 
"center. 11 The government: used the "Outlying Districts Ordinance" and the 
"Special Districts Ordinance" which had been retained from the colonial period 
to keep "the KPU' s national officials from entering "closed districts" and 
helping local officials fill out the lengthy and difficult forms that were 
required for an application for registration.27 Although KANU did not meet any 
difficulties from the government when it attempted to establish branches and 
sub-branches in these areas, the opposition complained bitterly that these 
ordinances were used to keep the KPU from organizing. As one KPU official 
noted, 
The government's designation of some areas as "closed dis-
tricts" is used by them to intimidate the opposition. 
Intimidation is especially against the KPU. (For instance), 
people can go in and out of Meru freely in spite of the law, 
however, if a KPU organizer tries to go in, the government 
will insist that he doesn't. Generally if you want to enter 
a closed district you get permission from the nearest Dis-
trict Commissioner. Thus if you live in Nairobi you get a 
permit from the Nairobi DC. If, however, a KPU person asks 
for a permit, the Nairobi DC claims that he must telegram 
the DC in the district that the KPU wants to visit. Further-
more, he makes the KPU person give him the money for the 
telegram to the district and for the reply back. This whole 
process takes several days and sometimes weeks. Sometimes he 
gets the permit and sometimes he is refused entry •••• 28 
Furthermore, individuals who attempted to organize for the opposition at 
the local level were intimidated by government and KANU officials. Once a 
person's name appeared on an application for registration as a local KPU 
official or as the landlord of a KPU office, he was often confronted by a 
government or party agent and threatened. A landlord, small businessman, or 
shopowner was particularly vulnerable to the economic sanctions of the state, 
as were individuals who needed the cooperation of local officials to find 
school places for their children and to obtain other sorts of state assist-
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ance. Violence was also used against the KPU, particularly in Central 
Province, where the KANU government was determined to keep the Kikuyu from 
splitting along economic and party lines. Confronted with the above threats, 
individuals would often deny that they had let space to the KPU or that they 
were party officials. Registration of branches and sub-branches would then be 
refused on the grounds that the applications had listed fictitious office-
holders or locations.29 
The regime was particularly effective in keeping the KPU from register-
ing its branches and sub-branches outside of Nairobi, in the so-called 
"periphery" and less so the "center." Twenty-nine out of the total ninety-five 
subbranches which were registered from 1966-69 were in Nairobi. 30 In part this 
had to do with the difficulties the KPU had in obtaining.permission to go to 
the "closed districts" to help local officials organize. In part it also had 
to with the greater ease KANU and government officials had in making their 
threats felt in the small scale societies in the rural areas. One official 
explained the problems of registration in the following terms: 
Organization in Nairobi was easy. It could be done in a 
short time and we could submit applications before the 
government had made up its mind to refuse registration. 
Outside in (the rural areas) it was not easy. We had to con-
tact people and collect them. Before a district has an 
office, you have to do all this from Nairobi •••• At first, 
before the intimidation, it was easy to get people to come 
forward and then with intimidation they would not like their 
names to appear on the application forms, although they were 
willing to do the donkey work for the party. In the country-
side the administration is so close to the people. The 
people therefore feel the pressures straight away. In the 
towns the PC is very remote. Pressures and government regi-
mentation gets to the people right away in the rural areas. 
This happens. In Nairobi people could do things without fear 
for some time, but outside people were so closely watched 
that organizing was very difficult. In Nairobi people could 
meet in offices. In----- every little thing that happens in 
my home people know.31 
Public Meeting 
Even when branches were registered, the party's freedom to organize was 
curtailed because the administration refused to issue the KPU with licenses to 
hold public meetings. The retention of the many vague laws which dealt with 
the holding of meetings during the colonial period provided the government 
with the tools it needed not only to restrict the KPU's ability to hold 
political meetings and gatherings, but also to keep the party from holding 
annual delegates conferences and to prevent its branch officials from assem-
bling informally. 32 A party which could barely organize its branches and could 
hardly hold any public meetings was severely hampered from competing with the 
dominant party. 
Shortly prior to the registration of the KPU, the Office of the Presi-
dent sent telegrams to all provincial commissioners stating the following: 
Licenses to hold public meetings to be issued to KANU 
members only stop. Seven days notice required stop. All 
other applications to be referred to President's Office 
stop. Permits issued to non KANU members to be cancelled 
with immediate affect stop •••• 
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Although some meetings were held by opposition MPs during the campaign for the 
"little general election," the government effectively curtailed the KPU' s 
ability to hold meetings afterwards. Sketchy data from mid-July 1966 to mid-
June 1967 reveals that KANU was issued with 505 licenses to hold public 
meetings while the KPU received none. 33 In addition, KANU ministers and 
assistant ministers were allowed to tour the country and hold meetings as a 
part of their governmenta 1 business with out having to app.ly for licenses. This 
trend continued through 1969 and it appears that the government's centrali-
zation of control over public meetings was quite effective. Although certain 
factions that were out of favor with the government in some of KANU's branches 
also had difficulties holding public meetings from time to time, the govern-
ment's policy was clearly directed against the entire KPU. This policy kept 
the KPU from holding meetings of all sorts and sizes, diminished the 
opposition's visibility, and made it extraordinarily difficult for the KPU to 
recruit members, advertise its program, criticize the government, or actively 
participate in the local by-elections held between 1966 and 1969. The govern-
ment's control over public meetings during this period demonstrated its 
ability to inhibit political participation by the opposition and thereby 
enhanced the strength of KANU relative to that of the KPU. 
The KPU complained through letters and in Parliament about the bias of 
the administration in the granting of licenses for pub lie meetings and 
attempted to remain politically neutral. However, civil servants appear to 
have been used as political agents of the executive much as they had been dur-
ing the colonial days and the following rather typical and exasperated letter 
from a local KPU secretary to his district commissioner was clearly to no 
avail: 
Dear Sir: 
We have written to you numerous letters accompanied by the 
necessary applications for public rally. 
It is absurd you have turned deaf ears to these requests. 
You have even ignored the rudimentary office routine of 
replying to letters in time. You will recall that the few 
letters you have replied you did when the date for intended 
meetings had expired ••.•. 
We would like to know if it is your deliberate intentions 
Mr.----- to refuse only KPU permission to hold public meet-
ings without any specific reason •••• 34 
It was in the so-called "periphery" rather than at the "center" that the 
government's decision to keep the KPU from holding meetings had its greatest 
impact. Peasants in the rural areas were more susceptible to government 
propaganda about the KPU than city dwellers, because the regime's monopoly 
over information was more complete here than in the urban areas. With KANU 
officials touring the coutryside, the KPU was at a severe disadvantage since 
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it had no effective means of countering their statements that the KPU was only 
a Luo party and that upon accession to power these leftist dissidents would 
communalize individual landholdings, labor, and even wives. Because they 
couldn't hold meetings, KPU officials were forced to rely on less effective 
means of organizing the party. Some attempted to speak to people in the mar-
kets, others at funeral orations, and still others attempted to do a kind of 
"door to door campaigning• 1135 However, the greater lack of anonymity in the 
rural areas made it more difficult to engage in these "unlicensed gatherings" 
than in the cities where it was harder to detect them. As one participant 
observed, "in Nairobi people could meet in offices.... When there was a meet-
ing in my house (in the rural areas) they would send a detachment of police 
straightaway and arrest people. 1136 Another KPU official noted, 
you must realize that we didn't have the publicity and the 
machinery of the press.to influence our people. Therefore 
throughout we de.alt by contacting individuals. This is what 
we called our door to door policy •••• In the rural areas we 
encountered very much the KANU onslaught against the KPU 
that the KPU is a Luo led party.... Administrative 
harassment was more in the rural areas because the DCs and 
DOs are more powerful there than in the urban areas •••• Of 
course, the harassment of primitive communities is an easier 
process than the harassment of urban communities who are 
aware of their rights. In rural areas, the administraiton 
can do practically anything they like •••• 37 
The door to door campaigning also had its drawbacks, because it necessitated 
relying on a larger body of capable individuals than meetings or more open 
organization by the party branches would have. Mentioning the difficulties of 
the door to door approach, an opposition member said, 
you can only do it after the education of the people and 
they agree to sacrifice all they have to do it. Of course, 
we had some youth who were doing it, but very crudely. Some-
times they offended people by collecting money. So you fear 
to send them unless they are people of integrity. Even if we 
had people like that going around, anyone who was found 
working for KPU was locked up •••• 38 
Whereas individuals who organized for the dominant party at least per-
ceived themselves as potential recipients of state patronage in return for 
their activity, KPU activists constantly had to make a reverse calculus and 
count the costs. The costs varied by their nature and their degrees, but 
individuals in the rural areas were no more immune to them than in Nairobi.39 
Laws and Constitutional Amendments 
A further hindrance on the KPU's organizational activities stemmed from 
the passage_ of a number of laws and constitutional amendments which either 
made it more difficult for the opposition to attract supporters and to compete 
with the dominant party or specifically increased the executive authority of 
the government. Among others, laws were passed which postponed local County 
Council elections for one year and the general elections for two, which forced 
MPs and local councillors who had changed parties to recontest their seats in 
an election, which abolished the Senate, which originally passed an act 
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requesting an Electoral Commission to increase the number of constituencies 
and then repealed it when the recommended locations appeared that they might 
favor the KPU, which revised the electoral laws making it impossible for inde-
pendents or individuals who were not nominated by local party organs to run, 
and which amended the Preservation of Public Security Act to include preven-
tive detention and empowered the president to bring it into effect for a wide 
variety of reasons. Several of these laws made it particularly costly to be in 
opposition both in the cities and in the rural areas. 
MPs and local councillors who were thinking of joining the KPU were 
forced to choose .between the security and benefits of retaining their offices 
and t-Oe insecurity and costs of running on an opposition ticket. The inse-
curity and costs were made particularly vivid prior to the Local Government 
Elections of 1968, when allegedly on instructions from the president, district 
commissioners (who were the local returning officers) disqualified all of 
KPU's 1800 candidates from nomination on the grounds that their papers were 
incorrectly filled out. The opposition noted that it was "a sad reflection on 
the character of those who now man the government administrative machinery 
that not a sinflle DC was prepared to lose his job in the interests of the law 
of the land. " 4 The consequences of the "election" were not only that KANU won 
"unopposed" on a countrywide basis. Individuals who had switched parties and 
taken the risk of running on the KPU ticket, had now lost their positions. 
Others who had declared themselves KPU, by virtue of the revised electoral law 
which prohibited independents from running, were now open targets for govern-
ment sanctions. Furthermore, the opposition had now lost its chances for 
representation on the local county councils. 41 This was particularly important 
since the couqty councils controlled numerous development services at· the 
district le1:el, inclu~ing "schg~ls, health services, secondary roads, markets 
(and) a variety• of licenses." · KANU' s electoral sweep of local government 
bodies thereby also worked to strengthen the dominant party's monopoly over 
economic resources and patronage. And so the repercussions of electoral laws 
which were passed in Nairobi were felt far away from Nairobi on a countrywide 
basis, and not simply at the so-called "center. 11 
If there was ever any question as to the government's intent in either 
passing or invoking the Preservation of Public Security Act it was removed one 
month later. when nine KPU MPs were arrested and detained without trial. From 
August 1966 until October 1969 when the opposition was banned at least seven-
teen of the nineteen individuals who were detained under the Act were members 
of the KPu. 43 Within the country at large, it is likely that the impact of the 
detentions was to up the costs of joining the opposition and thereby reduce 
the KPU's support. Furthermore, the detentions made it more difficult for the 
KPU to find individuals who would openly organize for the party at the local 
level. Finally, the dete·ntions undoubtedly contributed to the climate of fear 
that was evident throughout the countryside by mid-1968. At that time a survey 
was published in which 66 percent of those interviewed claimed that on at 
least one occasion they had been afraid to express their opinions or to criti-
cize the government because the secret police and· informers would report them 
and they would suffer. On a follow-up question in which the interviewees were 
asked if they thought "those fears of informers, secret police and so on 
(were) serious, imagination or absolute nonsense," 70 percent said they were 
"imagination" or "absolute nonsense.44 
The electoral laws that were passed between 1966 and 1969 demonstrated 
the regime's ability to use the country's legislative machinery to increase 
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its marginal strength at the expense of the KPU. As important, however, it 
also indicated something about the style of the regime's response to the oppo-
sition. During the colonial days, the government had attempted in part to 
control its enemies through numerous legislative acts and constitutional 
machinations. 45 From 1966-1969, the KANU government amended the constitution 
several times and introduced new electoral laws in part to reduce the opposi-
tion's opportunities to increase its strength. These changes paralleled the 
colonial government's tendency to control political opposition through 
legalistic innovations and reflected the "general cynicism about constitution-
alism" that had emerged from colonial days. 46 
The government's monopoly of economic resources and the impact of 
economic statism on the viability of opposition in Kenya explain in part (a) 
why Kenya's civil service was not politically neutral when it came to regis-
tering KPU branches and sub-branches, licensing its public meetings, or 
assuring it of fair elections, and (b) why a Parliament which was sometimes 
vocally opposed to legislation that was clearly repressive and designed for 
the KPU, nevertheless voted for it. 
Economic Statism 
The tendency for the state to be the chief dispenser of economic 
patronage from employment on down, developed under colonialism and was rein-
forced in the post-colonial period. The attractions of employment within the 
public sector as compared with the private sector contributed to the KANU 
government's hold over its employees, particularly those within the civil 
service. As of 1968, the public sector accounted for 36.6 percent of all 
salaried employment in Kenya. The local and central government together were 
responsible for supplying 71.1 percent of the jobs in this sector. Although 
employment in the private sector accounted for 63.3 percent of all salaried 
employment in Kenya, the public sector was nevertheless a more "critical sec-
tor for absorbing the risinf would-be employed and in particular the well 
educated would-be employed•" 7 During the period from 1965-68, the pub lie 
sector became increasingly critical. While employment in the public sector 
grew, employment in the private sector contracted. In one year, from 1967-68, 
empl'oyment within the pub lie sector rose by 4. 6 percent, an increase which was 
largely absorbed by central and local government authorities. In absolute num-
bers, ghe private sector still supplied more jobs than the public sector in 
1968. 4 Nevertheless, working within the public sector, in particular for the 
government, was more attractive for Africans than the private sector. Within 
the public sector, Africans were likely to obtain better earnings, better 
positions, and more amenities than they would in the private sector. 
as a follow-up to this statement, the government passed a Trade 
"which imposed some restrictions on non-citizen commercial 
In 1968, 
Licensing Act, 
activity."52 However, the public sector continued to be more attractive for 
high level manpower, since the Act was essentially directed against small 
Asian commerce rather than the large-scale activities of non-citizen Europeans 
and Asians. As of 1968, only four of the top fifty directors of private 
companies in Kenya were Africans and the heavy dependence of the 1966-70 
Development Plan on foreign investment made it unlikely that the government 
would put the same kind of pressure on these companies to Africanize as it had 
on small-scale Asian commerce. 53 It did not wish to diminish foreign confi-
dence in Kenya and therefore "preferred to delay Africanization objectives 
where these clashed head on with business efficiency • .,54 
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Having a position in the civil service meant not only a good job, but a 
particularly coveted one because of the status, power, and amenities that went 
along with it. Members of the provincial administration were in charge of law 
and order in their areas and controlled the distribution of a wide range of 
government resources including land loans and other sorts of patronage.55 
Furthermore, the civil service offered its employees security of tenure, pen-
sions, loans for cars, housing provisions or allowances, traveling, family 
separation and entertainment allowances, medical and dental treatment, and 
other fringe benefits.56 
The threat of being dismissed from the civil service if one displayed 
any sympathies toward the opposition party created pressures for civil 
servants to steer clear of the KPU as well as to actively aid the government 
in restricting the opposition's ability to participate in politics. Since the 
government defined working with government as working for KANU, civil servants 
could hardly afford to be genuinely neutral and still keep their jobs. 
Furthermore, one KPU official believed that civil servants "play(ed) up to the 
party in power in the hope that if they act(ed) correctly they (would) be 
rewarded with a promotion." 57 The fear of dismissal was not imaginery and was 
confirmed in April 1968, when the government admitted that "the civil servants 
so far discharged from the Service for participating in ~olitics have been 
discharged as a result of their collusion with the KPU •••• " 8 Some local KANU 
officials requested the dismissal of chiefs they regarded as pro-Odinga 59 and 
there were allegations that KANU youthwingers threatened to report civil ser-
vants they saw talking with members of the KPU. 60 One KPU MP noted that "a 
subchief in my location ••• could not accept a lift from me when very sick •.• 
without fear of losing his job, 1161 and another claimed "God help him or her if 
the fathers or friends are KPU supporters or are remotely related to KPU 
men."62 
The threat of losing a coveted job was a major factor in explaining why 
civil servants refused to allow the KPU to organize and freely compete with 
KANU. The added difficulty was that one also faced the prospect of unemploy-
ment upon dismissal, since a known 11dissident 11 could not hope to get a job in 
the private sector. As one KPU supporter noted, "no company wanted to be known 
for aiding the opposition. Therefore they would not give you a job. 1163 
Indigenous businessmen were dependent on the state for loans, non-c1t1zen 
Asians for trade licenses, and expatriate companies for the continued right to 
operate or expand their operations in a foreign country. Consequently, 
people who were known to be supporters of the KPU lost their 
jobs both in the government and in private employment. What 
used to happen was that managers and executives of private 
companies were approached and were threatened that if you 
employ KPU supporters it will be known that you are against 
the government and that you would either lose your trade 
licenses or be deported. Therefore these people had to 
comply. This was very effective because with the present 
unemployment for a man to lose his job because of politics-
well he would rather keep his mouth shut and keep his job 
than come out in the open in favor of the KPu.64 
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This dependence of the private sector on the state not only increased the 
likelihood that civil servants would remain loyal to KANU, but also made it 
extremely costly for any individual to be a KPU supporter whether he or she 
was working within either sector of the economy or was unemployed. Remembering 
his own tribulations, a KPU official recollected, 
I was under constant surveillance and was being harassed in 
my job and given warnings th_at I should behave. The police 
were following me everywhere now and again and were sleeping 
at my gate. When I came back from------, I was working at 
the----- Company. I was sacked, somebody probably spoke to 
my boss and told him 'that chap who is working for you is 
this and that.' My boss' wife invited me to a bar for drinks 
to tell me my boss was not happy with these things. I told 
her to go to hell and that her husband was my boss and could 
call me himself to his office. My boss finally told me "you 
have to decide when you are leaving. 11 • • • So I said, 'if my 
being here is going to kill ---- be plain and say so •••• 
Then I started an advertising firm. I got my company going 
and wanted to retain fees for the people I was working for. 
The government would ring people up and tell them to forget 
it and they would call me up and say forget it. The govern-
ment gave me the roughest time possible.... They really 
harassed me honestly.65 
MPs, like civil servants, were dependent on and indebted to the state 
for a variety of economic rewards. Once it was clear that KPU MPs would lose 
these rewards, it became extremely costly either to "cross the floor" and join 
the opposition or to vote with it in the National Assembly. By mid-1966, one-
third of all MPs had ministerial appointments, and another one-third had 
statutory board appointments, leaving only one-third who were not vulnerable 
to dismissal as a consequence of losing state favor.66 Among the remaining 
one-third there were clearly MPs who aspired to these positions and therefore 
also preferred to stay in the state's good graces. The desire to retain or 
obtain these appointments was understandable since they were important sources 
of salaries, fringe benefits, influence, and patronage. Most of the invest-· 
ments undertaken in the public sector were controlled by quasi- governmental 
statutory boards, which distributed a wide variety of loans and agricultural 
credit. From the standpoint of a constituent or an MP it was advantageous for 




As the table on the next page 
party who held positions on 
the Limuru Conference and the 
demonstrates, all members 
statutory boards lost their 
formation of the KPu.68 
of the opposi-
positions soon 
Conversely, KPU politicians and MPs who returned to KANU were often 
rewarded with statutory appointments or were given the KANU nomination in the 
by-elections that followed their return. As one recipient noted, "they don't 
give you this for nothing, but give it so that you will keep locked up, talk 
no more, and feel that you belong. u69 
An MP's economic security stemmed not simply from the salaries and perks 
that he received from his various appointments, but also from the loans that 
he could obtain to purchase cars, houses, farms, or businesses, by virtue of 
Table II 
Positions on Statutory Boards Lost by the KPU, 1965-69 
Z.M. Anyiene , ..........••.... Maize and Produce Board, 3/25/66 
Okuta Bala •.•.........••..... Industrial Commerce and Development 
Corporation, 4/66 
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Sugar Advisory Council and Development 
Finance Corporation (uncertain and date 
unknown) 
Chillo ....•••••...•.••....... Kenya Tourist Development Corporation, 1966 
Choge ...........•••.••....... Kenya Meat Commission, 7/12/66 
E.D. Godana •......•.......••. Chairman, Marsabit Joint Trade Development 
Board, 12/16/65 
J.D. Kali ...•••.•.......••..• Kenya National Trading Corporation, 1966 
Chairman, Export Promotion Council (date 
unknown) 1966 
Khalif ••..•..•..•••.••....... Central Selection Board (Government 
Bursaries), 1966 
Makokha .....•......•.•••..•.. Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board, 5/66 
Chairman, Busia Joint Trade Development 
Board, 7/22/66 
Film Censorship Board (date unknown) 
Obok ...•.•.•.•••.••.......••• Loan Defaulters Sifting Committee, 2/15/66 
Oduya ..•....•.....•..•••..••• Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board, 5/66 
Rotich ..........•.•..•.•.••.. Loan Defaulters Sifting Committee, 2/15/66 
Tanui ...•...•••••••.••..••... West Kenya Marketing Board, 12/21/65 
Central Housing Board (date unknown) 
Source: The Kenya Gazette, January 1965 - October 1969, and information 
obtained from Jay Hakes. 
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his position. Once he was defeated, joined the KPU, or lost favor with the 
state he could be forced to repay these loans. Consequently, since most MPs 
(like other members of the "salaried" middle class) had no independent entre-
preneurial base and were indebted to the state, they could become poor 
overnight. This threat was not idle and almost immediately after the formation 
of the KPU, opposition MPs were forced to pay up their car loans or face with-
drawal of their vehicles. lO Furthermore, KPU MPs who had initially crossed 
the floor and lost in the "little general election" were in a real bind. They 
were simulataneously in the position of having to repay their loans and of 
being unable to find any employment in either the public or private sectors 
because they had been tagged as dissidents. This situation forced some 
individuals to return to KANU and reminded potential sympathizers in the 
National Assembly of the costs of joining or voting with the KPu. 71 Given the 
opposition's lack of control over existing resources and the general lack of 
alternatives for those who wanted to keep what they had or for those who were 
upwardly mobile, the KPU simply could not compete with the inducements of the 
regime. 
The effects of economic statism were not simply confined to employment, 
the urban areas, or to the middle class. Individuals in the rural areas were 
warned by local party and administrative officials that anyone who voted for 
the KPU would not get famine relief maize being distributed by the government, 
shopowners were threatened that if opposition supporters were found on their 
premises the shop would be closed, individuals who had plots in settlement 
schemes were told that they would lose their farms if they voted with or 
supported the KPU, and chiefs were sometimes instructed by'district commis-
sioners to "write down the names of all KPU supporters in the area so that the 
government would take action against them." Furthermore, KANU officials and 
MPs threatened that individuals or areas who supported the KPU would be 
cutting themselves off from government loans and development funds. As two 
such appeals bluntly noted, 
If you vote for KANU, schools will be built, 
and brought to the border. If you don't, you 
roads graded 
are lost. ••• 
If you don't unite with the government, all secondary 
schools we are now trying to build will disappear. Kenyatta 
has sugar. Let's go lick his hands. I'm not lying.72 
The government's monopoly of economic rewards and the threat that they 
would be withdrawn decreased the opposition party's appeal at all levels of 
society on a countrywide basis. Since there were no economic alternatives to 
the regime's rewards and since the KPU was too poor to help m1n1mize 
individual losses that stemmed from the state's economic sanctions, it became 
extremely costly to support the KPU. The small scale nature of rural societies 
made it difficult to support the KPU anonymously or to be invulnerable to the 
regime's economic sanctions and rewards. There was no shortage of manpower 
working on the regime's behalf in the rural reas. Local KANU officials, civil 
servants, policemen, agents for the Central Intelligence Division and the 
Special Branch all had a vested interest in identifying KPU supporters to keep 
their areas from becoming opposition strongholds. If additional manpower were 
needed to watch a suspicious person or to vandalize a supporter's shop, unem-
ployed youthwingers could usually be found who were willing to work on the 
regime's behalf for a few shillings. 
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The Effects of the Regime's Monopoly on the Composition of the KPU 
The regime's monopoly of sanctions and economic rewards meant that the 
KPU could not openly compete with the dominant party or openly recruit 
supporters. The KPU had its greatest difficulties in gaining electoral and 
other sorts of support in areas outside the Luo stronghold of central Nyanza. 
This appears to have stemmed primarily from the KANU government's decision to, 
in effect, concede this area to the KPU and to make it extraordinarily 
difficult for the opposition to organize in other areas. Such an argument 
rejects the alternative explanation that the KPU could not compete with KANU 
outside of central Nyanza because it was a tribal party that did not have the 
catholic appeal of its competitor. 
The twenty-nine MPs who initially "crossed the floor" in March 1966 were 
not even an accurate indication of the support the KPU might have mustered in 
the House and the Senate under more normal circumstances. Although twenty to 
thirty more MPs apparently had promised to cross with the original twenty-
nine, they changed their minds after it became known that the government was 
planning to amend the constitution and force MPs who had changed parties to 
recentest their seats. 
The fact that six out of the nine KPU MPs who won the "little general 
election" were Luos from central Nyanza was more of a reflection of the 
regime's decision about where it would bring its coercive apparatus to bear 
and where it wouldn't than a true· test of the opposition party's strength. 
There were clearly KPU MPs who would have lost by virtue of their own weakness 
in any case. However, after the KPU had been banned, six ex-KPU MPs from 
non-Luo areas who had lost the 1966 election and returned to KANU, contested 
the general election of 1969 and won. Since these MPs had won in 1963 and in 
1969, there is some reason to believe that their losses in 1966, and probably 
some others, were due to electoral fraud or intimidation.74 
It was advantageous for the government to keep the KPU from winning out-
side of central Nyanza, since this confirmed its propaganda that the KPU was a 
Luo party. Of the five by-elections which were held between 1966 and 1969, the 
KPU defeated KANU only in 1969 in the Luo constituency of Gem in the heartland 
of central Nyanza. In contrast to the other four constituencies where all the 
machinations described in the earlier sections of the paper were used against 
the opposition, the KPU in Gem was allowed to hold meetings and to openly 
engage its branches and sub-branches in electoral activity. Furthermore, 
unlike some earlier contests, the administration imposed "strict discipline at 
the counting of the ballots" and was complimented on its fairness. 75 The argu-
ment that this freedom stemmed from the government's decision that it would be 
too costly to repress the KPU in its home area does not appear to be true (a) 
since less than one year earlier it had disqualified all KPU nomination papers 
for the 1968 elections and (b) because it banned the party and imprisoned all 
central Nyanza' s KPU MPs les·s than one year afterwards. Rather KANU' s loss in 
Gem could be explained away by the government as an "isolated case 1176 and used 
to show that Kenya was democratic and the KPU a tribal party. As one 
participant noted, "they left our area here, but they were so careful to 
disqualify all other tribes.••77 
The fact that the KPU had the majority of MPs in central Nyanza and that 
the administration allowed some minimal party organization gave the opposition 
a certain viability which it was difficult to match elsewhere. Whatever other 
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economic costs they were forced to pay, KPU MPs in central Nyanza still had 
their salaries because they were MPs. Some of this money clearly filtered down 
to supporters who were being penalized by the regime. In other parts of the 
country KPU's leaders suffered severely as a consequence of openly organizing 
for the KPU. Many could not sustain the costs and either returned to KANU with 
the promise of a job, or left politics entirely. In these areas, there was 
more fluidity among the leaders of the KPU than in central Nyanza and the 
reward structure for organizers or supporters virtually nonexistent. Over time 
it was more difficult to sustain KPU support because as one observer noted 
"some people can only take so much and then they break down.... There comes a 
time when things look very dark and people feel they have reached a dead 
end• " 78 Furthermore, because the KPU had MPs in central Nyanza and because 
Odinga was the "boss" of the area, the party's inability to hold public meet-
ings was of little consequence here in contrast to other parts of the country 
where they were necessary to counteract KANU's propaganda about the KPU. 
It was more costly for a Kikuyu to join the KPU than any other ethnic 
group, because of the threat that a tribal split posed to the governing class. 
There were many reports of physical violence against Kikuyus who supported the 
KPU and as one official noted in this regard, "people thought it was only jobs 
or business (that were at stake), but soon it became clear that it could be 
your life." 79 Although Kenyatta was virulent in his attacks against the 
opposition, he traveled to only two constituencies to speak against the KPU 
during the "little general election" and both were Kikuyu areas in central 
province. 
Non-Luo suport for the KPU existed in the trade union movement, in the 
universities, in professional groups, among the urban unemployed, and the 
rural discontented. Some supported the opposition because of its leftist 
policies on various issues including land, others because they perceived that 
the government was pursuing a policy of "Kikuyuization" in its distribution of 
development funds and employment, others as a general protest against KANU's 
inability to "deliver the goods" since independence, others out of a belief 
that it was time for change, and still others out of simple opportunism. The 
KPU as a party was as catholic in its appeal as KANU; however, the regime's 
monopoly over the key socio-economic resources and sanctions in the socie.ty 
had its toll on opposition party support and over time, both Kikuyu and other 
non-Luo support for the KPU either diminished or became less visible. 
The KPU clearly had its own problems and was not always a striking con-
trast to KANU. Like all parties it had a variety of internal difficulties 
including a lack of direction at headquarters, factionalism there and in its 
branches, personality squabbles, leadership struggles, misappropriation of 
funds, and allegations of a "cult of Odingaism." Furthermore, as the govern-
ment intensified its surveillance of KPU activities and it became more 
difficult to know whom to trust and whom not to trust, ethnic splits developed 
between the Luo and the Kikuyu in the Nairobi branch. However, since the KANU 
government never allowed the KPU to freely compete with the dominant party in 
a general countrywide election or to openly engage in organizational activ-
ities, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which these difficulties or the 
policies of the opposition party limited its support. It seems reasonable to 
conclude that the KPU's fundamental problem was not that it was too narrowly 
based to compete with KANU, but rather that the regime's monopoly of sanctions 
and economic resources enabled it to buttress the dominant party and to blunt 
opposition party activity on a countrywide basis. 
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Conclusion 
The legacies of countrywide authoritarian rule and economic statism as 
well as the reasons why inherited institutions and relationships were main-
tained after independence, may be useful in explaining why opposition parties 
have largely disappeared across the continent of Africa. There seems to be 
some agreement among scholars both that the structure of political competition 
in tropical Africa "appears unrelated to such variables as type of colonial 
experience, 118D and that "(m)odern cogfnialism in Africa everywhere tended 
toward bureaucratic authoritarianism." Furthermore, the tendency of colonial 
systems to stifle the development of an independent entrepreneurial class of 
Africans, to tie them to the state, and to create dependent economies was not 
unique to Kenya. 82 More specifically, the analysis concludes that: 
(1) The "center-periphery" argument cannot be maintained. The conven-
tional wisdom that Africa's paucity of economic resources and an 
underdeveloped technology limits the authority of regimes in the 
so-called "periphery" appears to be incorrect. The argument fails 
to take account of the way in which a regime I s monopoly of 
resources and sanctions and the small scale of most African 
communities facilitates political control in the rural areas as 
well as in the cities. 
(2) The strengths and weaknesses of African regimes are "task 
specific" rather than geospecific. It seems clear that with 
respect to certain tasks - namely the elimination of opposition 
parties - African regimes cannot be describ_ed as· having a "limited 
authority" that is confined to the narrow geographic domain of the 
urban areas. 
(3) Opposition parties may be as catholic in their appeal as dominant 
parties, but unable to muster widespread open support. In Kenya, 
the regime's monopoly of resources and sanctions and its conse-
quent ability to reward its friends, to coopt or punish 
dissidents, and to bring its authority to bear both between and 
during elections made it extremely costly to be a member of the 
KPU. Furthermore, this was especially true in non-Luo areas. 
(4) The tendency of scholars to see African parties and governments as 
extremely powerful or weak is ill-conceived. Behind the contorted 
arguments that the parties of independence were democratic and 
reflected "mass mobilization" was a II liberal desire not to see 
Africa fail. 11 Africanists "wanted . . . to accentuate the pos1 t1ve 
aspects of change in Africa, hitherto known as the Dark Conti-
nent. 1183 Behind the more recent argument that African regimes have 
only a "limited authority" in the urban areas, there lurks the 
view which is not so different from that of colonial admini-
strators and early anthropologists. There is a misguided 
predisposition to see large parts of Africa as traditional and 
untouched in spite of a near century of centralized rule. 
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